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Abstract
Teachers are required to improve their qualifications and abilities and, 
accordingly, support children’s mental development. In recent years, mentalizing—
the ability to understand the mental state of oneself and/or others —has been 
expected in education, and the development of mentalizing in children and teachers 
has become the focus of research. However, mentalizing comprises complicated 
components. Furthermore, since it includes various proximity concepts, it is diffi cult 
to understand how it can be effective for both teachers and children, especially 
as it is not a well-known process in Japan’s education system. Consequently, in 
this paper, we describe how mentalizing is regarded as one of a teacher’s crucial 
abilities. In addition, the relationship between mentalizing and close proximity 
concepts is explained. Accordingly, mentalizing encompasses self-others, implicit-
explicit, and cognitive-emotional understanding, as well as theory of mind to show 
cognitive understanding of others and empathic understanding of others. Moreover, 
emotional intelligence is considered to be almost synonymous with emotional 
mentalizing. In addition, metacognition is considered a fundamental ability in 
influencing the development of mentalizing. To a large extent, the ability of 
mentalizing is considered to overlap with theory of mind, empathy, and emotional 
intelligence. This concept is also believed to emphasize metacognitive introspection. 
Concepts that have seen as similar to mentalizing are imperative in children’s 
mental development. Consequently, research on teachers and children has actively 
been conducted. The ability of mentalizing to consider the perspectives, thoughts, 
and emotions of others is an important skill for teachers that could significantly 
contribute to the mental development of children.
Key words: Mentalizing; theory of mind; empathy; emotional intelligence; 
metacognition
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1. Introduction
Teachers are required to possess an attitude of autonomous learning and the capacity 
to constantly maintain and improve their teaching qualifications and abilities. In addition, 
they are expected to respond to the children in their care based on each child’s individual 
developmental issues and educational needs (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science 
and Technology, 2015). It is therefore essential that teachers understand themselves from 
an objective point of view and attempt to understand others, including children and their 
guardians, from a variety of perspectives; these skills are required as soon as they begin 
work. Akimitsu, Matsumoto, Fujiwara, and Arai (2009) held that a teacher’s ability for self-
understanding is vital, as the characteristics of teaching staff have a significant impact on 
children and classes. Teachers undergo self-refl ection and growth through interactions with 
their students (Akimitsu et al., 2009), and an ability to reflect on and modify one’s own 
behavior is linked to the ability to broadly understand the meaning of others’ behavior. 
Mentalizing is an example of this kind of ability.
Mentalizing is strongly related to the empathy, theory of mind, metacognition, and affect 
regulation that are necessary for the stable mental development of children and young adults 
(Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008/2014). It should therefore be of value in various arenas 
where support is provided, such as education (Swan & Riley; 2012, 2015), school community 
(Bak, Midgley, Zhu, Wistoft, & Obel, 2015), and careers (Taubner, Müller, & Kotte, 
2017). This is especially true in the area of teaching, in which mentalizing to understand 
others with different viewpoints and ways of thinking is considered an essential ability and 
applied research is advancing (Swan & Riley, 2012, 2015). Against this bakground, the 
term “mentalizing” has begun to draw attention in recent years and is being used by diverse 
researchers across various fields, including psychology. As a result, the concept is used 
in different ways by numerous researchers, causing confusion and a lack of clarity about 
mentalizing’s relationship to closely related concepts.
This paper, focused on the value of mentalizing in educational practices and its applicability 
therein, adopts for its investigations the concept of mentalizing presented by Fonagy and 
colleagues, particularly their research covering the developmental perspective. Specifi cally, 
this paper relates the concept of mentalizing and developments in mentalizing research, 
introduces closely related concepts, and discusses the applicability of mentalizing to 
education.
2. What Is Mentalizing?
2.1. Mentalizing Research
British psychoanalyst Peter Fonagy advanced the concept of mentalizing from clinical 
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practice and developmental perspectives (Fonagy, 1989; Fonagy, 1991; Fonagy & Target, 
1997). Mentalizing means understanding others using the ability to perceive and interpret 
the background of both one’s own and others’ behavior in terms of the mental states that are 
its drivers—needs, desires, emotions, beliefs, goals, purposes, and reasons (Allen & Fonagy, 
2006/2011; Allen et al., 2008/2014; Fonagy & Allison, 2012)—and the ability, formed 
through reflection (including self-reflection) and connection with others, to understand the 
self and others (Fonagy & Target, 1997). This concept has been central to early research 
in clinical practice, including French psychoanalyst Marty’s (1990) study of the treatment 
of psychosomatic diseases and Fonagy’s (1991) research into the treatment of personality 
disorders. Meanwhile, Fonagy and colleagues also pursued the concept of mentalizing from a 
developmental standpoint in attachment research (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Moran, & Higgitt, 
1991; Fonagy & Target, 1991).
The term “mentalizing” has also extended into many other disciplines, including theory-
of-mind research and brain and cognitive sciences (Baron-Cohen, 2003; Frith, 2001; Frith, 
Morton, & Leslie, 1991). Early studies in those fields measured mentalizing using theory-
of-mind tasks and treated the two concepts almost synonymously. However, it has been 
demonstrated that tasks eliciting a personal emotional experience, such as tasks involving 
moral dilemmas or understanding sarcasm, activate the region of the brain associated with 
mentalizing (Frith & Frith, 2003). As theory-of-mind tasks do not target mental–emotional 
experiences, we can consider mentalizing and theory of mind to be separate. Developments 
in brain science are also contributing to changing opinions. In this way, the development of 
mentalizing research in various disciplines has resulted in different defi nitions and concepts in 
each fi eld.
2.2. Mentalizing and Attachment
Bowlby (1976/1991) proposed the concept of attachment as the bonding system formed 
in early life between children and their caregivers, with the children using their attachment 
figures as a secure base from which to widen exploration and play. Further, children’s 
interactions with their attachment fi gures lead to the formation of an internal working model 
(IWM) during infancy (Bowlby, 1977/1991), according to which they develop expectations of 
the behavior of others and the ability to plan their own behavior based on those expectations 
(Bowlby, 1976/1991, 1977/1991).
The IWM in attachment theory comprises two aspects: the model that applies to the self, 
which relates to whether one believes oneself worthy of love, and the model that applies to 
others, which considers whether they are trustworthy (Bowlby, 1977/1991). This has been 
described as an intersubjective model representing the relationship between the self and others 
(Fonagy, 2001/2008). According to Fonagy (1991) and Fonagy and Target (1997), mentalizing 
develops on the foundation of an attachment indicative of a warm, secure relationship with 
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an early object (caregiver); acquiring this ability allows children to internalize. Further, it is 
thought that mentalizing ability is transmitted generationally through caregivers’ reflective 
connections with infants in the attachment–formation process (Fonagy et al., 1991; Fonagy & 
Target, 1997).
2.3. Mentalizing and Refl ective Function
Mentalizing is defined as using one’s imagination to capture and interpret the behavior 
of the self and others through perception of psychological states (Allen et al., 2008/2014). 
In mentalizing, questioning the self by means of reflection allows self-understanding and 
modification of one’s behavior (Fonagy & Target, 1997). Further, reflection on the various 
possible psychological states that may be driving the behaviors of others allows the prediction 
of their behaviors as meaningful acts (Fonagy & Target, 1997). Fonagy et al. called the ability 
fundamental to the formation of this kind of interpersonal relation refl ective function (Fonagy 
et al. 1991; Fonagy & Target, 1997).
According to Fonagy and his collaborators, refl ective function is a psychological ability, 
indispensable to children’s emotional development and affect regulation in infancy, that forms 
the foundation of internal observation of mental activities (Fonagy et al., 1991); it plays an 
important role in children’s self-organization (Fonagy & Target, 1997). As a result, refl ective 
function and mentalization are treated as synonymous abilities that allow understanding of 
others’ behaviors and mental states (Fonagy & Target, 1997). Reflective function may be 
classed as a mentalizing ability developed in the relationship with attachment fi gures.
2.4. Facets of Mentalizing
2.4.1. Self–Other
Mentalizing requires an understanding of the inner aspects of the self and others as well 
as an external, objective understanding of both; without entirely separating these aspects, it 
focuses alternately on both self and other, deepens understanding, and aims at elaboration 
of the self and understanding of both the self and the other (Allen et al., 2008/2014). In 
mentalizing, self-understanding and understanding of the other reinforce one another (Allen & 
Fonagy, 2006/2011), and it is important to carefully balance the bias in understanding toward 
one or the other that may occasionally arise (Allen et al., 2008/2014).
2.4.2. Implicit–Explicit
Mentalizing requires both implicit and explicit understanding of the mental states of the 
self and the other. In other words, it requires the ability to understand the mental states of the 
self and others automatically and intuitively, to carefully consider the mental states of the self 
and others as understood, and to express this as a narrative (Allen et al., 2008/2014). While 
people frequently implicitly understand their own thoughts and feelings and those of others, 
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implicit comprehension is not enough to fully understand the self and others or to evaluate and 
modify one’s own behavior. To look inward to one’s implicit understanding of one’s thoughts 
and feelings and those of others and to explain them explicitly according to context—thereby 
intermittently reflecting on whether one’s interpretations are correct and considering other 
possibilities—is to properly mentalize. However, as it is diffi cult to distinguish conscious from 
unconscious processes, it is hard to draw a clear boundary in the relationship between implicit 
mentalizing and explicit mentalizing (Allen et al., 2008/2014).
2.4.3. Cognitive–Affective2)
Mentalizing is the understanding of thoughts, emotions, desires, and other states on both 
sides of the self’s relation with another, including understanding both the cognitive and 
the emotional aspects in both parties. It is therefore possible, when mentalizing, to become 
entangled in the powerful emotions that one holds regarding others or, conversely, in others’ 
intense emotions. When mentalizing in relation to experiences of powerful emotion, it is 
essential to refl ect on the emotions of the self and the other and to consider and acknowledge 
what is meaningful in the truth of those emotions; this closer understanding of one’s own 
emotional experiences develops one’s ability for affect regulation (Fonagy, 2002). As in the 
dimensions of self–other and implicit–explicit, understandings of cognitive and emotional 
aspects in mentalizing are intricately interrelated and cannot be clearly separated or 
distinguished.
3. Mentalizing’s Closely Related Concepts
As discussed above, mentalizing requires understanding mental activity in terms of self–
other, implicit–explicit, and cognitive–affective (Allen et al., 2008/2014). Thus, it is related to 
various concepts important to human mental development, including theory of mind, empathy, 
emotional intelligence, and metacognition. The following sections clarify the applicability 
of mentalizing to education by revealing its differences with these ideas, the relationships 
between mentalizing and these closely related concepts.
3.1. Theory of Mind
3.1.1. What Is Theory of Mind?
Theory of mind may be considered foremost among concepts charting our ability to 
understand others. Theory of mind is a concept proposed following Premack and Woodruff’s 
2) “Affect” is translated as jyōdō in the Japanese version of Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman (2008). There are many 
interpretations of the difference between affect and emotion. This paper references Fukuda (2008), according to 
whom affect refers to temporary, powerful emotions accompanied by a physical response, such as anger, while 
emotion is a broad category that covers social emotion, intellectual emotion, and affect.
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observational studies (1978) in which chimpanzees exhibited behavior akin to reading the 
minds of others, and it holds that an “individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental 
states to himself and others.”
It is thought that children generally acquire theory of mind between four and six years 
of age, with false-belief tasks3) used to measure the acquisition or lack thereof (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983). While prediction and explanation of another’s behavior require knowledge 
of two among the three factors of their beliefs, desires, and actions, this is not sufficient 
to understand theory-of-mind tasks, which necessitate an understanding of the process of 
mental representation (Astington, 1993/1995). Moreover, once a theory of mind is acquired, it 
continues to develop, and its acquisition and normal development are considered indispensable 
requirements for communication in society (Koyasu, Hattori, & Gōshiki, 2000).
3.1.2. The Relationship Between Theory of Mind and Mentalizing
From his research with children with autism, who have diffi culty acquiring theory of mind, 
Baron-Cohen proposed two terms related to mentalizing (Baron-Cohen, 1995/2002).
The fi rst was mindreading. Baron-Cohen (1995/2002) posited the “mindreading system”4) 
as the process by which children acquire theory of mind. While “mindreading” and “theory 
of mind” were treated as synonyms in this earlier work, they were distinguished in a later 
paper (Baron-Cohen, 2005) that added empathy to the system, following which mindreading 
was treated synonymously with mentalizing (Baron-Cohen, 2009). Frith and Frith (2005) 
gave a mechanistic account of mentalizing as an ability to understand others: the ability to 
“read” the psychological states that determine others’ actions. This differs from the concept of 
mentalizing as proposed by Fonagy et al.
The second term proposed by Baron-Cohen was mindblindness5) (1995/2002). Mentalizing 
is considered the antithesis of mindblindness (Allen & Fonagy, 2006/2011; Allen et al., 
2008/2014). Japanese research with children with autism has theorized that a lack of 
mentalization ability is behind the diffi culties that children with autism have in understanding 
the thought processes of others (Kondō, Kobayashi, & Miyazawa, 2013; Yoshida, Takata, & 
Inui, 2005).
3.1.3. Differences Between Theory of Mind and Mentalizing
When understanding the minds of others, children consider both their own experiences 
3) False-belief tasks are tests used to investigate development (acquisition or lack thereof) of theory of mind. Typical 
tasks including the Maxi test, Sally-Anne test, and Smarties task, all of which aim to discover whether participants 
recognize the divergence of belief between people who observed a particular phenomenon and those who did not.
4) Mindreading is defi ned in Baron-Cohen (1995/2002) as the ability to imagine the meaning of others’ behavior and, in 
a revised edition (Baron-Cohen, 2005), as “the ability to interpret one’s own or another agent’s actions as driven by 
mental states.”
5) Baron-Cohen (1995/2002) proposed the term “mindblindness” to refer to the inability of children with autism to 
understand others’ beliefs, which he believed to be a mindreading defi cit.
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and the intentions of others (Tomasello, 1999/2006), and theory of mind and mentalizing 
both must be understood from a developmental perspective. However, theory of mind and 
mentalizing have differences. For example, theory of mind is used to understand the other, 
while mentalizing requires an understanding of the mental states of both oneself and the 
other in relation to a particular event. The false-belief and perspective-taking tasks6) used to 
index theory of mind investigate whether the thoughts and feelings of the other have been 
correctly understood and measure whether participants have acquired theory of mind. In 
contrast, mentalizing refers to understanding the self and the other through refl ection; rather 
than measuring the correctness of this understanding, the dimensions of mentalizing (e.g., the 
balance of emphasis between understanding of the self and of the other, fl exibility of thought) 
and quality of reflection (e.g., its depth and breadth, whether reflective or ruminative) are 
considered important processes and measured.
Baron-Cohen (2005) distinguished between empathy and theory of mind. Likewise, 
Mizokawa and Koyasu (2015) stated that the theory-of-mind ability to understand others is 
not necessarily linked to empathy, whereas mentalizing requires an empathetic understanding 
gained from putting oneself in the position of the other. Further, the subjects of theory-of-mind 
research have primarily been infants, and the focus has been on whether it has been acquired, 
while mentalizing has no age limit and develops and changes over a lifetime.
3.2. Empathy
3.2.1. What Is Empathy?
The term “empathy” is said to have been first used in 1909 by British psychologist 
Edward Titchener. Empathy is considered to have two subcategories: cognitive empathy, by 
which one infers and understands the emotional state of the other, and emotional empathy, 
which involves not only understanding the emotional state of the other but sharing in it, an 
experiential reaction that induces a physical response of one’s own (Umeda, 2014). Although 
the definition of empathy varies according to the perspective of the researcher, it refers 
broadly to the response of one individual to the observed experiences of another (Davis, 
1983). Eisenberg and Strayer (1987) distinguished empathy from sympathy, presenting the 
former as covering emotional experiences corresponding to the emotions of others, but the 
cognitive and emotional sides of empathy were later combined, along with sympathy, into one 
broad concept.
Moreover, as the concept of empathy is linked to prosocial behavior, numerous studies have 
explored its relation to, for example, helping behavior, morality, interpersonal competence, 
and self-efficacy (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1980; Davis, 1983; Hoffman, 1963). Currently 
6) For example, the (revised) Eye Test devised by Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, and Plumb (2001), shows 
participants photographs of various faces in which only the expression in the eyes is visible and asks them to interpret 
each individual’s emotions.
26
OSAKA HUMAN SCIENCES
favored is a multidimensional approach that recognizes individual variation and development 
(Davis, 1980, 1983; Hoffman, 1987).
3.2.2. The Relationship Between Empathy and Mentalizing
Prerequisites for empathy are the ability to see the perspectives of both self and other and 
the ability to separate and detach the mental states of the two (Katō, 2014). The ability to 
imagine the emotions and thoughts of others by putting oneself in their position is called 
role-taking (Hoffman, 1977) or perspective-taking (Davis; 1980, 1983), and it is considered 
a subtheory of empathy. Davis (1980, 1983) created the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 
to measure various facets of empathy; it uses subscales of perspective-taking and fantasy 
(cognitive empathy) and empathic concern and personal distress (emotional empathy). As 
mentalizing requires adopting another’s perspective in addition to one’s own and fluidly 
switching between them, perspective-taking is also an important tool in assessing mentalizing 
(Luyten, Fonagy, Lowyck, & Vermote, 2012).
3.2.3. Differences Between Empathy and Mentalizing
A strong link between mentalizing and empathy is suggested by the attitude of empathetic 
understanding of the self and the other that forms part of mentalizing (Allen & Fonagy, 
2006/2011; Allen et al., 2008/2014). Allen et al., referencing Preston and de Waal (2002), 
stated that empathy and mentalizing resemble one another: both comprise a broad range of 
responses from automatic (implicit) to conscious (explicit), and both entail mental elaboration 
(Allen & Fonagy, 2006/2011; Allen et al., 2008/2014). Further, both require attention to 
the mental state of the other and the other’s representations, the understanding of which is 
believed to change based on individuals’ experiences (Allen et al., 2008/2014; Preston & de 
Waal, 2002). However, attention and orientation in empathy, while directed at both the self 
and the other, are chiefl y used to understand others’ mental states. Mentalizing requires that 
attention be directed at one’s own and others’ emotions and emotional states, that these be 
understood, and that their reasons be identifi ed (Allen et al., 2008/2014).
3.3. Emotional Intelligence
3.3.1. What Is Emotional Intelligence?
Salovey and Mayer (1990) proposed emotional intelligence as a subtheory of social 
intelligence, defining it as “the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings, to 
discriminate among them, and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and action” 
(p. 189). Mayer, DiPaolo, and Salovey (1990) considered emotional intelligence to be a type 
of information processing that allows people to improve their daily lives by perceiving and 
evaluating their own and others’ emotions. In contrast, Boyatzis (2009) called this ability 
emotional competence and emphasized that it is a capability or characteristic that leads to 
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superior results, particularly in work-related arenas.
Indicators of both emotional intelligence and emotional competence are separated into 
self and other, each measured by fi ve subscales. Of these, four are common to both concepts: 
emotional understanding, identification, regulation, and expression; the remaining subscale 
for emotional intelligence is emotional awareness, and for emotional competence, it is using 
emotions (Brasseur, Gregoire, Bourdu, & Mikolajczak, 2013; Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 
1999). While there are various opinions on both concepts, competence is generally held to be 
a learned ability rather than a mental capacity (Boyatzis, 2009). Whereas Mayer et al. (1999) 
distinguished emotional intelligence and emotional competence, Allen et al. (2008/2014) 
presented emotional intelligence as a concept closely related to mentalizing.
3.3.2. The Relationship Between Emotional Intelligence and Mentalizing
Emotional intelligence comprises various facets—awareness, understanding, identifi cation, 
regulation, expressing emotions, and perceiving others’ emotions. These facets cover 
mentalizing’s implicit and explicit aspects of perception and response of emotions (one’s 
own and those of others) as well as its regulation of one’s own emotions; this means that 
multifaceted emotional intelligence presents several areas of overlap with emotional 
mentalizing. Further, evaluations of emotional intelligence can be divided into verbal and 
nonverbal (Mayer et al., 1990). On the nonverbal side, emotions can be communicated by not 
only people’s expressions and movements but also through colors, designs, and art, including 
photographs. While mentalizing assessments include story tasks that use photographs 
(Dziobek et al., 2006; Valle et al., 2016), the authors found no current studies on mentalizing 
assessments using inanimate objects or colors.
3.3.3. Differences Between Emotional Intelligence and Mentalizing
As stated above, emotional intelligence may be considered a concept closely related 
to emotional mentalizing as the ability to understand, identify, and express emotions 
and understand those of others. However, emotional intelligence is limited to emotional 
psychological states, while mentalizing can extend beyond the emotional to cover all 
psychological states, including intention or thought (Allen et al., 2008/2014). Moreover, 
mentalizing does not include any ability to regulate the emotions of others. Even in terms of 
one’s own affect regulation, experiencing one’s emotions with clarity is deemed prerequisite 
to reflecting on them with clarity, such that feeling emotions is given more attention than 
regulating them (Allen et al., 2008/2014). Further, while emotional intelligence does not cover 
general self-awareness and appraisals of others (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), mentalizing covers 
the innate and general senses of the self, as self-image acquisition and development of the self 
are thought to infl uence the development of mentalizing (Fonagy & Target, 1997). In addition, 
correspondence between appraisals of others and the extent of one’s own self-understanding 
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and the understanding of others is one measure of adequate mentalizing and is evaluated in 
clinicians’ assessments in clinical practice (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006).
3.4. Metacognition
3.4.1. What Is Metacognition?
Metacognition is a concept proposed by Flavell (1979) and defined as “cognition about 
cognitive phenomena.” Flavell separated metacognition into “metacognitive knowledge” and 
“metacognitive experiences” and understood that the two interact. Metacognitive experiences 
were later referred to as metacognitive activity. Flavell (1979) described metacognitive 
knowledge as knowledge and beliefs about how the processes and outcomes of cognitive 
enterprises are affected, and he divided it into the three categories: knowledge of person 
variables, knowledge of task variables, and knowledge of strategy variables. These can 
be simplified as knowledge about people’s cognitive characteristics, tasks, and strategies, 
respectively (Sannomiya, 2018). Flavell (1979) posited that metacognitive experiences are the 
cognitive and emotional experiences produced before, during, or after undertaking a cognitive 
enterprise, regardless of its duration or content.
Metacognitive activity involves metacognitive monitoring, whereby information fl ows from 
object-level to meta-level, and metacognitive control, in which information fl ows from meta-
level to object-level (Nelson & Narens, 1990). Cognition of external objects is carried out 
at object-level, while only cognitive processes relating to the context of the object-level are 
carried out at the meta-level (Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994; Nelson, 1996). Sannomiya (2018) 
summarized metacognitive monitoring as “the perception, prediction, inspection, evaluation, 
etc., of cognition” and metacognitive control as “the establishing of aims and plans relating to 
one’s cognition, and their modifi cation.”
3.4.2. The Relationship Between Metacognition and Mentalizing
Of the three characteristics into which metacognitive knowledge can be divided, “knowledge 
about people’s cognitive characteristics” connects most closely with mentalizing. People 
unconsciously store various experiences—including things that they have seen, thought, and 
felt—as knowledge, and these metarepresentations7) are referenced to understand one’s own 
mental state and those of others. This corresponds to Fonagy and Target’s statement (1997) 
that knowledge of mental states gained by experience leads to improved refl ective function 
(mentalizing).
However, as indicated by Sannomiya (2016), if metacognitive knowledge is skewed, 
metacognitive activity will also be skewed. This is relevant to the attachment formation that 
7) This is the representation of another representation. Perner (1991) theorized that children around four years of age 
acquire the ability (metarepresentational capacity) to understand that the mind is not reality itself but a representation 
(refl ection of reality), and this understanding allows them to acquire a theory of mind.
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is the basis of mentalizing: metacognitive monitoring of experiences with attachment fi gures 
and the metacognitive knowledge thereby formed are believed to be vital to the appropriate 
development of mentalizing (Main, 1991). Mentalizing therefore involves modification of 
skewed metacognitive knowledge through investigating various possibilities concerning one’s 
own mental state and those of others by means of refl ection.
In metacognition, processing is carried out at two levels: object-level and meta-level 
(Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994; Nelson, 1996); these correspond, respectively, to cognition 
and metacognition. Further, in the metacognition process, metacognitive monitoring and 
metacognitive control are carried out based on self-reflection. A similar process is carried 
out in mentalizing: when understanding the mental state of the self and others, monitoring 
thoughts and feelings and self-regulation are undertaken consciously, in the metacognitive 
mode, and as are modifi cations to that understanding (Allen et al., 2008/2014).
3.4.3. Differences Between Metacognition and Mentalizing
The concept of mentalizing holds that refl ective-function constructs affect regulation and 
self-monitoring and enable mentalizing (Fonagy & Target, 1997). Therefore, the perception 
and control of cognitive processes involved in metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive 
control are thought to have a considerable effect on the attention to one’s own and others’ 
mental states; they are also thought to significantly affect the ability to fluidly control 
and switch between the emotions involved in mentalizing. As a result, metacognition is 
a necessary feature of mentalizing, and metacognitive activity plays a vital role in the 
development of mentalizing. Further, the task-level control system of metacognition is thought 
to be a precursor to mentalizing (Proust, 2003), and metacognition may be considered a 
metarepresentation system comprising the attention and control necessary for self-mentalizing 
and an essential ability for mentalizing.
However, while the domain of mentalizing is centered on one’s own and others’ emotions, 
metacognition is used in cognition as a whole and so covers a broader area.
4. Mentalization and Its Possibilities in Education
Thus far this paper has explored mentalizing and its closely related concepts, and it has 
examined the relationships among them. As described above, mentalizing has multiple 
dimensions (i.e., self–other, implicit–explicit, and cognitive–affective) and requires objective 
understanding of the self and empathetic understanding of others. Mentalizing therefore 
encapsulates theory of mind, which refers to a cognitive understanding of others, and empathy, 
which indicates an empathetic understanding of others. Further, emotional intelligence, the 
ability to understand the emotions of both the self and others, is nearly synonymous with 
emotional mentalizing. However, emotional intelligence has a goal-oriented dimension 
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and deals only with emotions, so the two may be considered similar concepts presenting 
areas of overlap. Finally, metacognition (meta-level thinking) entails attention, observation, 
refl ection, and control, which make it a fundamental ability that infl uences the development 
of mentalizing. Metacognitive ability related to understanding the self and others supports not 
only mentalizing but also theory of mind, empathy, and emotional intelligence.
Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (2016) called for 
the capacities of “proactive, interactive, and deep learning” to be cultivated in children. With 
this recommendation, the ministry extolled the need for a “zest for life” in children’s future 
social and professional lives; these capacities are thought to support both the ability to form 
effective interpersonal relationships and the creative thinking that allows fl exible responses. 
As theory of mind and empathy are considered vital for children’s mental development, 
teachers are asked to make educational interventions tailored to each child (Mizokawa & 
Koyasu, 2015). Moreover, current research includes investigation into classes that promote 
metacognitive thinking to improve students’ communication skills (Sannomiya, 2017) and the 
relationship between emotional intelligence and school adjustment (Toyota & Yoshida, 2012). 
Mentalizing, considered to be strongly related to these concepts, appears to be an essential 
ability for teachers and children alike.
Mentalizing research has been developed primarily in clinical settings related to 
psychoanalysis and developmental research, but the value of mentalizing in educational 
settings has garnered increasing attention in recent years. For example, research intended 
to teach mentalizing has been carried out in projects targeting elementary schools to reduce 
bullying and aggressive behavior (Fonagy et al., 2009; Twemlow et al., 2005a, 2005b; Valle et 
al., 2016). Mentalizing is an important factor in coping in interpersonal relationships, allowing 
thoughts to be flexibly transferred to suitable subjects (Bak, 2012), and the ability to put 
oneself in the places of others with different perspectives and thoughts is considered a vital 
skill for teachers (Swan & Riley, 2015).
5. Conclusion
Attachment fi gures, who are considered important for children’s stable mental development, 
can be found beyond the household during and after childhood; attachments are formed with 
fi gures other than caregivers (Murakami & Sakurai, 2014). Children whose experiences are 
adequately mirrored and understood by caregivers with highly developed mentalizing abilities 
are thought to engage their own mentalizing abilities in attempts to understand others beyond 
their caregivers (Fonagy & Target, 1997). The transmission of mentalizing ability through 
interaction is also thought to be present in connections among teachers and children, and it is 
presumed to work effectively in the formation of other attachments throughout childhood.
Each study of the mind presents various positions and outlooks. Mentalizing is closely related 
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to the variously interpreted concepts of theory of mind, empathy, emotional intelligence, and 
metacognition, and mentalizing is itself a complex concept with multiple constituent parts. 
Thus, the authors do not claim to have fully explored the relationships among these concepts 
for this study. However, as children’s relationships with important adults are considered to 
have a significant impact on their mental development, their mentalizing connections with 
teachers and support workers encountered daily at kindergarten, school, support facilities, 
and elsewhere are surely signifi cant. It is hoped that this study will be a catalyst for further 
investigations into the value and applicability of mentalizing in education and front-line 
support.
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